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NOTE




Technological advances have provided the medical community with methods to
prolong the lives of critically ill and disabled infants. These advances have
drawn the attention of members of Congress, resulting in governmental at-
tempts to regulate parental decisions concerning the extent of medical treatment
to be rendered in these cases. After examining the brief history of the resulting
regulations, the author recommends that, absent providing for comfort care to
the ill infant, governmental regulation is inappropriate.
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INTRODUCTION
Advances in neonatology, and perinatology2 have allowed infants
born with significant defects or deformities to be kept alive.3 Since
1. Neonatology is the branch of medical practice involved in the care of a new-
born child. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 837 (2d ed. 1982).
2. Perinatology is the branch of medical practice involved in the care of a preg-
nant woman near the time of birth. Id. at 923.
3. Defective children who, in the past, would have died naturally, can now be
1
Havlisch: Treatment Decision-making in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit—Gov
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
1940, the infant mortality rate in the United States has been more
than halved. 4 Some of these infants go home to bring great joy to
their parents. Some of these infants may lead productive, independ-
ent lives in society. However, for others, the result may be institu-
tionalization, repeated, highly invasive surgeries, or an inability to
care for themselves. In the most severe cases, these children may be
incapable of any human interaction and put a great social and eco-
nomic stress on the rest of the family.5 These are tragic situations
which underscore the importance of considering the potential bene-
fit to be derived from intensive treatment.
Traditionally, parents, with physicians' guidance and support,
have made medical treatment decisions for their critically ill and dis-
abled infants.6 The development of biomedical ethics committees
has provided additional support and consultation. 7 Recently, special
interest groups have pressured government at all levels into imple-
menting regulations aimed at monitoring medical treatment deci-
sions concerning critically ill and disabled infants.8 Parental
autonomy in this decision-making process is being challenged.9 As a
result, parents are faced with expensive, traumatic, and annoying
legal battles to defend their treatment decisions.O
This Note begins by delineating the considerations in today's cul-
ture that necessitate medical decision-making about critically ill and
disabled infants in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). The his-
tory and implications of governmental involvement in this decision-
making process are then discussed. This Note then analyzes the con-
stitutional right to parental autonomy in medical decision-making
and outlines the appropriate functions of the various levels and
branches of government. Finally, this Note concludes that beyond
kept alive. In hospitals with neonatal intensive care units, [hereinafter NICU], the
infant mortality rate is half of that in hospitals without intensive care units. Duff &
Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED.
890, 890 (1973); see also Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Who
Decides, and On What Criteria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377, 379 (1983).
4. Between 1940 and 1980, neonatal deaths dropped from 28.8 per thousand to
8.5 per thousand live births. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 77 (104th ed. 1984); see also Duff& Campbell, supra note 3, at 890.
5. See Longino, supra note 3, at 386-87.
6. S. JORDAN, DECISION MAKING FOR INCOMPETENT PERSONS xiv (1985).
7. See generally Gibson, Kushner, Will the "Conscience of an Institution" Become Soci-
ety's Servant? HASTINGS CENT. REP., at 9, 10 (June, 1986).
8. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983) (parental authority over treatment de-
cisions unsuccessfully challenged by a third party); In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-001A
(Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind., Apr. 12, 1982).
10. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13
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providing non-burdensome, symbolic comfort care, governmental
intrusion into the medical decision-making process is unwarranted.
I. TREATMENT DECISION-MAKING REQUIRED IN THE NEONATAL
INTENSIVE CARE UNIT
The "vitalist"11 approach to treatment decisions creates a signifi-
cant risk that the life of a critically ill and disabled infant will be un-
justifiably prolonged.12 This approach assumes that noncomatose,
nonterminal life is always preferable to nonexistence.IS Undeniably,
there are conditions, other than irreversible coma or imminent
death, in which some people would choose a shorter life over a
longer life of very poor quality. Treatment policies in adult patient
care areas are addressing this possibility. Physicians are required to
obtain the informed consent of an adult patient for life-saving or life-
prolonging treatment. 14
An infant's inability to express a preference regarding the continu-
ation of life should not require a longer life of significant suffering. 15
The doctrine of "substituted judgment"16 has long been used to in-
sure that the best interests of an incompetent or a minor child are
observed in medical decision-making.17
The ever-increasing capability to support life may often produce
treatment with significant harm, as well as benefit.18 At some point,
the burden of painful and disabling treatment outweighs the benefit
of a chance of survival with a diminished quality of life.19 The physi-
cian violates the ancient and honored Hippocratic principle of pro-
11. Vitalism refers to the principle that "life is the ultimate value, and something
that is to be preserved regardless of prognosis, regardless of cost, and regardless of
social considerations." Moskop & Saldanha, The Baby Doe Rule: Still a Threat, HAS-





16. "Substituted judgment" allows a court to substitute its own judgment for
that of an individual or, in the case of an incompetent, his guardian. Classen, Safe-
guarding Human Autonomy: The Need for Judicial Activism, 23 Hous. L. REV. 857, 859
(1986).
17. See generally id. at 859-60 (discussing equitable aspects of the substituted judg-
ment doctrine). But see Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrines; A Critical Analysis, 1 Is-
SUES L. & MED. 131 (1985) (discussing the practical unworkability and theoretical
incoherence of the doctrine).
18. Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 10. See generally Stinson & Stinson, On
the Death of a Baby, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, at 64 (July, 1979) (describing treatment of
premature baby over five months before allowing him to die); Strong, The Tiniest
Newborns, HASTINGS CENT. REP., at 14 (Feb., 1983) (discussing complications of pre-
maturity, survival rates and cost of care).
19. See Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 11.
19871
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fessional ethics, "[fjirst, do no harm," when aggressive treatment
significantly harms an infant without the prospect of greater com-
pensating benefits. 20
Infants whose conditions are severe enough to raise questions
about the wisdom of aggressive treatment are fairly common in
NICUs.21 Sophisticated life-support systems make it possible to sus-
tain the lives of critically ill and disabled infants. Technology, how-
ever, cannot ameliorate severe underlying handicaps or prevent life-
threatening complications. 2 2 Adopting a "save now, cure later" pol-
icy is impractical and will surely produce an undesirable effect on the
distribution of health care. 23
Aggressive treatment often results in great financial expense.24
Today, at least ten percent of the gross national product is expended
on health care. 2 5 Additional funds spent on health care may not
yield as much benefit today as they did previously.26 Even if addi-
tional funds are expended for medical care, they may yield a greater
benefit if directed to other areas, such as basic research or preventive
health care, rather than aggressive life-support.27
Treatment decisions are required in light of advances in technol-
ogy which prolong the life of critically ill and disabled infants without
providing compensatory benefits for the parents, child, or society.
Dollars spent in the NICU represent dollars not spent and lives lost
20. Id.
21. Among such conditions are extreme prematurity, severe intracranial hemor-
rhage, severe asphyxia, trisomy 13 (patay syndrome) and 18 (Edward's syndrome),
and multiple severe congenital anomalies (such as spina bifida cysticia, which is char-
acterized by a high lesion meningomyelocele with hydrocephalus, quadriplegia, scoli-
osis and incontinence). Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 9-10. See generally
Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1283, 1285-94 (1985) (describing the nature and variety of neonatal medical
problems by diagnosis category).
22. Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 10.
23. Id. at 11-13.
24. Neonatal intensive care is very expensive. According to one study, the aver-
age cost per patient is over $20,000. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,886 (1985). "A Canadian study
calculated the cost in 1978 dollars to be $52,182 per survivor weighing 1000 to 1499
gms and $89,892 per survivor for newborns weighing 500 to 999 gms." Moskop &
Saldanha, supra note 11, at 11; See also Zook & Moore, High-Cost Users of Medical Care,
302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 996 (1980).
25. Meisel, Grenvik, Pinkus, Snyder, Hospital Guidelines for Deciding About Life-Sus-
taining Treatment: Dealing with Health "Limbo," CRITICAL CARE MED., at 239 (March,
1986) (citing P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF MEDICINE 380 (1982)).
26. Id. at 239.
27. Id. For example, the artificial heart can be considered aggressive life sup-
port. The question becomes "do we ... want to provide an artificial heart for all of
the 140,000 potential candidates for this procedure at a cost of $3 to $5 billion annu-
ally?" Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 14 (citing Rowlands, Bionic Bill's Heart.
Critics Say Deficient, MEDICAL NEWS AND INT'L Rvr., at 9 (Feb. 4, 1985)).
[Vol. 13
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in another segment of the health services delivery system.2 8 In addi-
tion, the physician must be allowed to practice medicine without be-
ing called on to violate the obligation to do no harm. 29 Even though
treatment decisions are necessary, the question of who makes the de-
cisions remains.
II. GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION IN THE PROCESS OF TREATMENT
DECISION-MAKING
All three branches of government at both the federal and the state
level have intervened in the process of treatment decision-making.3O
The absence of clear guidelines concerning the non-treatment of
critically ill and disabled infants continues today despite a barrage of
judicial,31 regulatory,32 and legislative33 activity in the last five years.
Three federal lawsuits have been filed,34 two administrative rules
have been promulgated and struck down,35 and legislation on the
subject has been enacted by Congress. 36 State legislation and ad-
ministrative regulations were developed to incorporate the federal
mandates.37 The result of this activity is law with ambiguous lan-
guage which has already caused confusion in the courts of
Minnesota.38
A. Executive Comment Resulting in Administrative Regulation
Widespread public debate on the care and treatment of critically ill
and disabled infants began with In re Infant Doe in Bloomington, Indi-
ana, in the spring of 1982.39 Baby Doe was born with Downs Syn-
28. See Kramer, Ethical Issues in Neonatal Intensive Care: An Economic Perspective, in
ETHics OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 75, 77-78 (M. Garland & A. Jonsen ed. 1976)
(discussing economic considerations behind treatment decisions).
29. Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 14.
30. See infra notes 39-157 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Moskop & Saldanha, The Brief But Stormy History of Federal Intervention,
HASTINGS CENT. REP., at 10 (Apr., 1986) (discussing American Academy of Pediatrics v.




34. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986); United States v.
University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aft'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.
1984); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
35. See 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983), 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984).
36. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota's legisla-
tion in this area).
38. See infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
39. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind., Apr. 12,
1982), writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. State ex rel Infant Doe v. Banker, No. 4825
§ 140 (Ind. Sup. Ct. May 27, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
1987]
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drome4o and a tracheo-esophageal fistula4 1 that precluded normal
feeding. His parents refused to consent to corrective surgery and
asked that food and water be withheld. The hospital sought court
intervention but the Indiana Supreme Court refused on the grounds
that the parents had made a reasonable treatment decision.42 The
county attorney and the guardian ad litem then sought emergency
action in the United States Supreme Court.43 The case, however,
was mooted by the baby's death after six days without food or water.
Responding primarily to public concern over the death of Baby
Doe, President Reagan directed a memorandum to the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) on April 30, 1982. The directive concerned the
enforcement of federal laws designed to prohibit discrimination
against handicapped persons. 44 The president's memorandum elic-
ited prompt action by the DHHS.
On May 18, 1982, the DHHS issued a "Notice to Health Care
Providers" who receive federal funding. The letter reminded ap-
proximately 7,000 hospitals of the provisions of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,45 and set forth DHHS's position that sec-
tion 504 makes it unlawful to withhold nutritional sustenance or nec-
essary medical treatment from handicapped infants.46
40. Down's Syndrome or Trisomy 21 is a common chromosomal disorder result-
ing in mental retardation. Congenital heart defects and intestinal obstructions com-
monly occur at birth. Rhoden, supra note 21, at 1287-88.
41. A tracheo-esophageal fistula is an abnormal connection between the esopha-
gus and the trachea which allows food (milk in the newborn) to be aspirated into the
lungs. Surgical correction is required immediately in the newborn period to avoid
asphyxia and pnuemonia from aspiration. G. SCIPIEN, M. BARNARD, M. CHARD, J.
HowE, P. PHILLIPS, COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC NURSING 650-53 (1975).
42. Following the hearing, the court accepted the contention of the parents and
their attending physician that a "minimally acceptable quality of life" was never pres-
ent in a child with Down's Syndrome. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Cir. Ct.
Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12, 1982). The court determined that the parents, "hav-
ing been fully informed of the opinions of two sets of physicians, have a right to
choose a medically recommended course of treatment for their child in the present
circumstances" and ordered Bloomington Hospital "to allow the treatment pre-
scribed" by the mother's obstetrician "as directed by the natural parents." Id.
43. For a procedural review of In re Infant Doe, see Longino, supra note 3, at 381
n.30.
44. The directive stated that "[riegulations under federal law specifically prohibit
hospitals and other providers of health services receiving federal assistance from dis-
criminating against the handicapped." Wash. Post, May 1, 1982, at A 1l, col. 3.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 states in part: "[n]o otherwise qualified
handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." Id.
46. Discrimination Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or
Nourishment, Notice of Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (June 16, 1982)
(notice issued May 18, 1982, applying 45 C.F.R. § 84 to health services for handi-
[Vol. 13
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On March 7, 1983, the DHHS promulgated an "interim final
rule," to become effective on March 22, concerning nondiscrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap under section 504.47 The regulation
required health care facilities receiving federal financial assistance to
conspicuously post a notice stating: "Discriminatory Failure to Feed
and Care for Handicapped Infants in this Facility is Prohibited by
Federal Law."48 This interim regulation also established a 24-hour
"hotline" to report suspected cases of handicapped infants who were
being discriminatorily denied nutrition or medical care.49 The regu-
lation also required access to business records after normal hours
when necessary to protect the life and health of handicapped
capped children). The notice stated it was "unlawful for a recipient of federal finan-
cial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or
medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening condition, if: 1)
the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and 2) the handi-
cap does not render treatment or nutritional sustenance contraindicated." Id.
47. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983).
48. The rule provided:
Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. 80.6(d), each recipient that provides covered
health care services to infants shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous
place in each delivery ward, each maternity ward, each pediatric ward, and
each nursery, including each intensive care nursery, the following notice:
DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR
HANDICAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED
BY FEDERAL LAW
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states that:
Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discriminatorily
denied food or customary medical care should immediately contact:
Handicapped Infant Hotline
U.S. Department of Heath and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Phone 800- - (Available 24 hours a day)
OR
Your State Child Protection Agency
Federal law prohibits retaliation against any person who provides informa-
tion about possible violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Identity of
callers will be held confidential. Failure to feed and care for infants may also
violate the criminal and civil laws of your State.
48 Fed. Reg. 9631-32 (1983) (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 9631. The notice further advised that persons having knowledge that a
handicapped infant is being discriminatorily denied food or customary medical care
should contact a "Handicapped Infant Hotline" by means of a 24-hour toll-free tele-
phone number listed on the sign. Id. No definition of "customary medical care"
appeared in the rule. In Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, the court found that, "as even the
most cursory investigation by the Secretary would have revealed, there is no customary
standard of care for the treatment of severely defective infants." (Emphasis in origi-
nal). Id. at 400.
This "customary care" language proved to be very embarrassing to the DHHS.
In documenting the claims that treatment of infants with certain anomalies was a
widespread practice requiring immediate governmental action, Surgeon General
Koop has relied on various surveys showing that pediatricians would withhold treat-
ment from certain infants. These surveys, therefore, demonstrated that it was the
1987]
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individuals.50
On March 21, 1983, the day before the effective date of the interim
final rule, a report was issued by the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research.5t A chapter of the report discussed the treatment of
seriously ill infants and newborns. The Commission's report ex-
amined the actual medical practices involving critically ill and dis-
abled infants and found instances of seriously erroneous treatment
decisions to be "very rare." 52 The report criticized the approach
taken by the new rule, hereinafter referred to as "Baby Doe" Rule
1.53
Despite this criticism, the DHHS proceeded to implement the rule.
Nonmedical teams, designated by the DHHS as "Baby Doe Squads,"
responded to anonymous calls to the DHHS under the rule. 54 The
withholding of treatment that was customary, making the requirement that hospitals
provide "customary care" thoroughly ambiguous.
The health care profession strongly opposed the rule. Public posting of notices
with the hotline number resulted in calls from disgruntled hospital employees, ill-
informed bystanders, such as parents of other infants, and cranks. During the first
four weeks the first hotline was in operation, almost 400 calls were received, many of
which were "hang-ups" and "cranks." Culliton, "Baby Doe" Regs Thrown Out By Court,
220 Sci. 479, 479 (1983).
When the calls were genuine, "Baby Doe squads" were immediately dispatched
to the hospital in question to investigate the matter. Each geographical region was to
identify a specialist and an alternate for medical consultation. These specialists
would comprise the "special assignment Baby Doe squad team." Team members
were to investigate immediately if they received a report. Id.
No violations of the rule were found, but the appearance of the Baby Doe squads
upset parents of defective children as well as parents of other infants. In at least one
instance, parents who had read in the local newspaper of a DHHS investigation re-
moved their critically ill child against medical advice before treatment could be com-
pleted, because they feared that the hospital being investigated was somehow
harming children. Id. at 480. In addition to upsetting parents, the Heckler decision
noted the potential and consequences for interfering with hospital personnel:
In a desperate situation where medical decisions must be made on short
notice by physicians, hospital personnel and often distraught parents, the
sudden descent of "Baby Doe" squads on the scene, monopolizing physi-
cian and nurse time and making hospital charts and records unavailable dur-
ing treatment, can hardly be presumed to produce higher quality care for
the infant.
561 F. Supp. at 399.
50. Hospitals were required to provide access to their premises and medical
records to agency investigators. 48 Fed. Reg. 9632 (1983).
51. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (1983)).
52. Id. at 208-09.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. But cf. Hoving, The "Baby Doe"
Cases, 72 A.B.A.J. 50, 51 (1986) (discussing Surgeon General Koop's opinion that the
reports of disruptive DHHS investigations were exaggerated).
[Vol. 13
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DHHS investigated forty-nine reports and found no violation of sec-
tion 504.55 The validity of "Baby Doe" Rule I did not go unchal-
lenged in the federal courts.
B. Judicial Response to Administrative Regulation
The first judicial challenge of the administrative regulations took
place in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler.56 Soon after the
"Baby Doe" Rule I was proposed, the American Academy of Pediat-
rics filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the rule.5 7 On April
14, 1983, a few weeks after the rule took effect, it was struck down by
Judge Gesell of the United States Disrict Court for the District of
Columbia.58 The court invalidated the regulations for being hasty,
arbitrary and capricious,59 and for failing to follow the Administra-
tive Procedures Act.
60
After the "Baby Doe" Rule I was invalidated by Judge Gesell, the
DHHS published a new proposed rule in July, 1983,61 and solicited
public comment.6 2 The proposed rule was virtually identical to the
55. Culliton, supra note 49, at 479; Krieger, "Baby Doe" Rule's Succeses Told, AM.
MED. NEWS 1, 6 (Aug. 19, 1983).
56. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
57. Id.
58. Judge Gesell cited numerous shortcomings in the rule, including the impossi-
bility of hospitals and physicains meeting the nonexistent standard of "customary
medical care," and the unlikelihood that the DHHS investigations, which were based
on questionable information from anonymous tipsters, would produce a higher qual-
ity of care for infants. Id. at 399-403; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59. The court found the DHHS lacked a rational, factual basis for the rule. 561
F. Supp. at 403. It did not rule on the plaintiff's claims that the Secretary lacked
statutory authority to act. Id. at 401. Nor did the court address whether the regula-
tion intruded without justification into family-physician relationships protected by
the Constitution. Id. at 402-03.
60. The DHHS failed to follow mandatory procedure for advance notice of and
public comment on the rule. It was not issued in accordance with the public notice or
30-day delay-of-effective date requirements of the Administrative Prodecure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (d) (1982). Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 400-01. Judge Gesell con-
cluded that "[o]nly by preserving the democratic process [of widespread notice and
public comment] can good intentions be tempered by wisdom and experience." Id.
at 403.
61. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care for
Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) (proposed rule modifying 45
C.F.R. § 84.61).
62. The DHHS received 16,739 comments, of which 16,331 (97.5%) supported
the proposed rule and 408 (2.5%) opposed it. Other aggregate descriptions are:
-Of 322 nurses, 314 (97.5%) supported and 8 (2.5%) opposed it.
-- Of 100 handicapped persons, 95 (95%) supported and 5 (5%) opposed it.
-- Of 141 pediatricians or newborn care specialists, 39 (37.7%) favored and 102
(72.3%) opposed it.
-Of 253 physicians, not including pediatricians or newborn care specialists, 140
(55.3%) favored and 113 (44.7%) opposed it.
1987]
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one stricken by Judge Gesell. The American Academy of Pediatrics
submitted extensive comments on the proposed rule.63 The Acad-
emy stressed its opposition to the federal intervention contemplated
by the rule and proposed, instead, the establishment of Infant
Bioethical Review Committees as a condition of receiving federal
funds. 64 The committees, consisting of both physicians and nonphy-
sicians, would assist parents and physicians in making difficult treat-
ment decisions concerning critically ill and disabled newborns. The
committees would also recommend institutional policies concerning
the withholding or withdrawal of medical or surgical treatment from
infants and would serve as educational resources for hospital person-
nel and families of seriously ill infants.65
The comment process produced a rule that differed from earlier
versions. Some consideration of the comments presented by the
Academy and others was apparent. The new rule, "Baby Doe" Rule
II, took effect on February 13, 1984.66 Although refined, "Baby
Doe" Rule II retained many of the provisions of the first rule.67
-Of 137 comments from hospital officials and medical, hospital, nursing, and other
health related associations, 31 (22.6%) favored and 106 (77.4%) opposed it.
-Of 77 comments from associations representing the handicapped, all supported
the proposed rules.
-Of 100 parents of handicapped persons, 95 (95%) supported and 5 (5%) opposed
it.
Letter-writing campaigns by right-to-life groups skewed the result but it was
clear pediatricians and health-related organizations were not satisfied with the pro-
posed rule. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984).
63. See generally Strain, The American Academy of Pediatrics Comments on the "Baby Doe
H" Regulations, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 443 (1983) (outlining the Academy's response
to the proposed rule).
64. "A Proposal for an Ethics Committee," (July 5, 1983) (submitted by the
American Academy of Pediatrics in its comments to the DHHS).
65. Id.
66. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1984).
67. While the "Baby Doe" Rule II still employed the use of signs, they were re-
duced in size and needed only to be posted so as to be visible by those directly af-
fected (i.e., the medical and nursing staff). Id. § 84.55(b)(2).
The signs were entitled "Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants." The sub-
stance of the required notice was changed to "nourishment and medically beneficial
treatment (as defined with respect for reasonable medical judgments) should not be
withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of their present or anticipated
mental and physical impairments." Id. § 84.55(b)(3). The phrasing of the notice no
longer gave rise to the presumption that the hospital had engaged in the past wrong-
doing. In addition, the signs did not refer to the previously undefined "customary
medical care" standard. Id.
The original regulations failed to provide guidance to physicians concerning
their legal obligations. Instead, the rules mandated that physicians follow "custom."
In the neonatal setting, where treatment methods are new, no medical "custom" has
been defined. Instead of offering useful guidance to physicians, the original regula-
tions frightened the physician into treating all infants in all cases. The result was
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While the DHHS was in the process of preparing the final "Baby
Doe" Rule II, an infant referred to as "Baby Jane Doe" became the
focus of a controversy in the New York state, 6 8 and federal courts.
69
The scope of the DHHS's regulatory authority in specific circum-
stances was the issue considered in this second judicial challenge of
the now revised administrative regulations.70
The facts of the challenge revolved around the birth of Baby Jane
Doe on October 11, 1983, in a New York hospital. She suffered from
multiple birth defects, including spina bifida, microcephaly and
hydrocephalus.71 While surgery was likely to prolong her life, it
would not improve many of her disabling conditions, including se-
vere mental retardation. After consulting with physicians, nurses,
often "over-treating" at the expense of increased suffering on the part of incurable
and dying infants.
Surgeon General Koop claimed that it was not the Administration's intent to
prolong the dying process. The "medically beneficial" amendment was an attempt to
clarify their position. However, what constitutes "medically beneficial" treatment
begs the question of the criteria used to judge such treatment, including the extent to
which quality of life judgments can be used by parents and physicians in determining
"medical benefit." Id. § 84.55(e)(1)(c).
This regulation goes on to encourage hospitals to set up Infant Care Review
Committees (ICRC) to aid DHHS policy enforcers and investigators. While not man-
dating such committees, the new rule encouraged their formation and set forth
guidelines for their operations. The model sees this group developing treatment
guidelines for the management of specific cases or diagnoses and reviewing specific
cases brought by those involved in treatment decisions. In reviewing treatment ter-
mination cases, the committee must appoint one member to act as an advocate for
the infant to ensure that all consideration in favor of the provision of life-sustaining
treatment are fully evaluated and considered. Id. § 84.55(f).
The model is heavily weighted in favor of continued treatment. If the family
refuses consent, but the ICRC disagrees with the family (whether or not the family is
supported by the physician), the ICRC is expected to recommend to the hospital that
a court or child protection agency be notified. Id. § 84.55(f)(3)(F).
The DHHS makes it clear that it sees the ICRC as its local investigatory arm.
DHHS investigators will make immediate contact with the ICRC when a complaint is
made. After examining the ICRC's point of view, the DHHS may require a written
report of its findings, accompanied by pertinent records and documentation. Id.
§ 84.55 (c)(d)(e). One wonders if this responsibility of an ICRC is really any different
than allowing "Baby Doe Squads" access to medical records under the first rule.
The second set of regulations retained the subtance and thus, the problems of
the original proposal. The ICRC was an encouraging sign but the guidelines focus
on medical rather than ethical considerations, making them little more than in-hospi-
tal "Baby Doe" squads.
68. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186,469 N.Y.S.2d
63, aff'g 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
69. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd,
729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
70. See id.
71. Spina bifida refers to the exposure of the spinal cord and membranes. Micro-
cephaly refers to an abnormally small head. Hydrocephalus refers to the accumula-
tion of fluid in the cranial fault. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146.
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religious advisors and others, the parents decided to forego the cor-
rective surgery. Instead, the parents chose "conservative" medical
treatment consisting of good nutrition, the administration of antibi-
otics, and the dressing of the baby's exposed spinal sac. 72
Court proceedings surrounding Baby Jane Doe began on October
16, 1983, when an attorney, who was unrelated to the baby and her
family, commenced a proceeding in New York State Supreme
Court. 73 The attorney petitioned for the appointment of a guardian
ad litem and an order directing the hospital to perform surgery. The
court appointed a guardian ad litem. After an evidentiary hearing,
the court concluded that surgery was necessary and ordered that it
be performed.74
The next day, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court reversed the decision and dismissed the proceeding.75 The
court found that the parents' decision was based on responsible
medical authority and was in the best interests of the infant. 76 The
court's decision was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.77
The court held that the case should never have been permitted to go
forward from the outset from a procedural standpoint. 78
While the action involving the guardian appointment and order to
perform surgery was still in progress at the state level, the federal
government became involved in the controversy. The DHHS re-
ceived a complaint from an unidentified "private citizen" that Baby
Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied medical treatment on the
basis of her handicaps in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. 79 The DHHS repeatedly requested that the hospital pro-
duce all of Baby Jane Doe's medical records since October 19, 1983,
citing as legal authority its investigatory powers under section 504.
72. Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
73. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146. See also Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 211, 456 N.E.2d
at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
74. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 147.
75. Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
76. Id.
77. Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
78. Id. New York's highest court, found that the trial court had abused its discre-
tion by permitting the procedure to go forward. First, the petitioner had no direct
interest in or relationship to any party and had failed to contact the State Department
of Social Services. Second, the trial court had failed to seek the Department's investi-
gative assistance. Id.
79. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 147. The DHHS obtained a copy of the state
court record and forwarded it to the Surgeon General of the United States, who
detemined that immediate access to the baby's current medical records was necessary
before a judgment could be made about whether Baby Jane Doe's care was "within
the bounds of legitimate medical judgment, rather than based solely on a handicap-
ping condition which is not a medical contraindication to surgical treatment .... " Id.
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The hospital refused to honor the DHHS request.8 0
The Department of Health and Human Services then brought a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York. 8 ' The suit challenged the hospital's refusal to allow the
DHHS access to the medical records.82 The government alleged that
the hospital violated section 504 and section 80.6(c) of title 45 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. 83 The federal district court held that
the hospital did not have to disclose the medical records because it
had not discriminated against Baby Jane Doe by failing to perform
surgery.8 4
The government appealed this decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.85 This court held that section 504
does not apply to treatment decisions involving seriously ill
newborns. 8 6 The legislative history, 87 the case law interpreting sec-
tion 504,88 and the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 197389 did
80. Id. at 148.
81. See University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1984).
82. Id. at 609.
83. Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) (1983). Section 80.6(c) requires recipients of federal
assistance to permit the responsible department official or his designee access to in-
formation pertinent to ascertain compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions of
45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1983).
84. 575 F. Supp. at 614. The trial court ruled in favor of the parents and the
hospital. First, the court found that the hospital had not discriminated against Baby
Jane Doe because the hospital could not institute surgical procedures without paren-
tal consent. The hospital was willing to perform the surgery but did not do so be-
cause the parents had refused consent. Second, the parents' decisions were
reasonable and based on a genuine concern for the best interests of the child. Id. at
614-15.
85. 729 F.2d at 144.
86. Id. at 156-57. The court concluded that an infant suffering from multiple
birth defects would not ordinarily be considered "otherwise qualified" under section
504. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Neither the language or the history of
the Rehabilitation Act bring the medical treatment decision involving infants with
numerous birth defects into its ambit. The court went so far as to say that "[w]here
the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if
ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was 'discriminatory.'"
729 F.2d at 157.
87. The court reasoned that the legislative history of the statute indicated that
Congress never intended section 504 to apply to treatment decisions involving criti-
cally ill and disabled infants. Id. It concluded that the articulated purpose of section
504 concerned access and admission to federally funded programs and activities for
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals and not the "far-reaching position ad-
vanced by the government in this case." Id. at 161 (citing Montana Power Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 445 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
88. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 160. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (while not directly on point, both cases indicate that the govern-
ment's interpretation of section 504 exceeds the authority conferred by Congress).
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not sustain the DHHS's authority to obtain the infant's medical
records. The court concluded that absent a clear congressional di-
rective allowing federal intervention in the medical decision-making
process, "it would be an unwarranted exercise of judicial power to
approve of the type of investigation that has precipitated this law-
suit."90 The Second Circuit's decision in the Baby Jane Doe case
put the legal status of the "Baby Doe" Rule II at issue. This deci-
sion led to the third federal judicial challenge.
Several medical groups brought a lawsuit91 challenging the "Baby
Doe" Rule II on the theory that the Second Circuit's decision in the
Baby Jane Doe case rendered the rule invalid.92 On June 11, 1984,
the medical group plaintiffs obtained a nationwide injunction
prohibiting the DHHS from implementing the "Baby Doe" Rule II
and from undertaking any other actions to regulate treatment deci-
sions involving critically ill and disabled infants.93 The district court
held that the BabyJane Doe decision established that the DHHS had
no authority under section 504 to investigate or otherwise regulate
treatment decisions involving these infants.
94
Appeals to the United States Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court followed. On December 27, 1984, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
in American Hospital Association v. Heckler.95 The case was renamed
American Hospital Association v. Bowen 9 6 at the Supreme Court level
when the DHHS secretary changed. On June 9, 1986, the Supreme
Court held no evidence existed to show that hospitals had discrimi-
nated against handicapped infants or had refused treatment sought
by parents.9 7 The Court went on to say that federal intervention in a
Cf. Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir. 1982) (commenting that recip-
ients of federal funds must make a "special effort" with those funds to satisfy the
national policy that Congress embodied in section 504).
89. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating Congress intended the Rehabilitation Act to offer handi-
capped individuals an opportunity to pursue employment, education and recrea-
tional goals free of the additional handicap of discrimination against them); Connolly
v. United States Postal Service, 579 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that Con-
gress intended the Rehabilitation Act to be the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination by a federal employer on the basis of handicap).
90. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 161.
91. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd,
794 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'dsub nom. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct.
2101 (1986).
92. Id. This lawsuit was filed on March 12, 1984, in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York,
93. Id.
94. 585 F. Supp. at 542.
95. 794 F.2d at 676 (no published opinion).
96. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
97. Id. at 2113-17.
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sensitive area usually left to state agencies is not needed.98 It is be-
lieved by some that the Court's decision will reinforce the primacy of
the family and the doctor in medical decision-making.99
C. Congressional Response to Judicial Mandates:
More Administrative Regulation
Federal child abuse legislation was originally enacted in 1974 as
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.100 The Act estab-
lished a federal funding program to assist states and other entities in
preventing and treating child abuse and neglect.10l Under regula-
tions implementing the Act, the terms "child abuse and neglect" are
defined to include, among other things, the failure to provide "ade-
quate medical care" for a child.102
Late in the summer of 1984, a coalition of medical, disability, and
right-to-life groups met with six United States senators.103 They
drafted compromise legislation which was enacted by Congress and
signed by the President.104 While American Hospital Association v.
Heckler (Bowen)10 5 was being heard in the lower courts, the legisla-
tion was enacted as part of the 1984 amendments to the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act.106
The Child Abuse Amendments (CAA)107 provided the clear con-
gressional directive called for by the court in United States v. University
Hospital.1O8 A legislative intent to allow governmental intervention
in the medical decision-making process was established. The legisla-
98. Id. at 2121-23.
99. See Malcolm, "Baby Doe" Truly a Case of the '80s, St. Paul Pioneer Press and
Dispatch, June 15, 1986, GI, col. 4; see also The "Baby Doe" Ruling, L.A. Daily J.,
June 12, at 4, col. 1.
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2101-15 (1982).
101. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
102. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2 (3)(i) (1985).
103. The senators represented an unlikely mix of conservatives and liberals:
Christopher Dodd, D-Conn.; Orrin Hatch, R-Utah; Jeremiah Denton, R-Ala.; Alan
Cranston, D-Cal.; Don Nickles, R-Okla.; and Nancy Kassebaum, R-Kansas.
104. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 123, 98 Stat. 1749
(1984) (amending the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5105-
25 (1982)).
105. 106 S. Ct. 2101.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-15 (1986). The Act established The Department of the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect. The Center's primary responsibilities
are to make state grants to implement child abuse and neglect treatment programs,
fund private research organizations attempting to prevent, identify and treat child
abuse and neglect and to coordinate federal child abuse and neglect progams. Id. See
generally Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 50 Fed. Reg.
14,878, 14,878 (1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340) (a background summary of
the NCCA, its purpose and goals).
107. Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 123, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984).
108. 729 F.2d at 161. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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tion is described as "a careful balance between the need to establish
effective protection of the rights of disabled infants and the need to
avoid unreasonable governmental intervention into the practice of
medicine and parental responsibilities."109 Under this legislation,
the states, rather than the federal government, implement programs
and procedures addressing the problems of child abuse and neglect,
including instances of medical neglect.
The CAA, like the original legislation, focus on state child abuse
agencies, rather than on the federal government, as the authorities
capable of investigating "Baby Doe" complaints. In order to receive
federal grants for state child abuse and neglect programs under the
CAA after October 9, 1985, states must have in place within their
child protective systems, procedures or programs designed to re-
spond to reports of medical neglect.' 1 0 The CAA included "with-
holding of medically indicated treatment" from disabled infants with
life-threatening conditions as a form of medical neglect."l, Under
109. Murray, The Final, Anticlimactic Rule on Baby Doe, HASTINGSCENT. REP. at 5
(June, 1985) (quoting Robert Haggerty, American Academy of Pediatrics president).
Members of all factions involved in the negotiations of the compromise legislation
are claiming victory.
110. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, §§ 121-23, 122, 98
Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (amending the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-03 (1986)). Every state has a Child Protective Service (CPS) sys-
tem regardless of whether the state obtains federal grant money under the Act.
These agencies are designated by the states to respond to child abuse and neglect.
Id. The focal point of their efforts is "on the family-to protect the child, preserve
the home, prevent separation of the child from the family if at all possible, prevent
further abuse or neglect and alleviate or correct the factors leading to the report."
Id. Further, the "agency generally regards its contact with the family as a demonstra-
tion of community concern and evidence of a desire to be of help to both parents and
children." Id.
Under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Minnesota receives Child
Neglect & Abuse Basic State Grant No. 05 CA 5388/09-2 in the amount of$158,521
for the eighteen months beginning September 30, 1985.
111. Id. § 121, 98 Stat. at 1751. The phrase is defined as:
[T]he failure to respond to the infant's life threatening conditions by provid-
ing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydrations, and medication)
which, in the treating physician's or physicians' best judgment, will be most
likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions, except
that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment other than
appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication to an infant when, in the
treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (a) the in-
fant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (b) the provision of such treat-
ment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be
futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or (c) the provision of such treat-
ment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the
treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
Id. The Senate sponsors of the measure noted in a joint explanatory statement that
"reasonable medical judgment" refers to a medical judgment that would be made by
a reasonably prudent physician who is knowledgeable about the case and treatment
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the new amendments, the DHHS is required to publish regulations
implementing the new requirements, including guidelines for hospi-
tal ethics committees, and to provide technical assistance to the
states."t 2 The DHHS is not, however, authorized to investigate or
take other action on individual "Baby Doe" cases such as was con-
templated by the earlier "Baby Doe" rules.11
On December 10, 1984, the DHHS issued preliminary guidelines
for implementation of the CAA. 114 These preliminary guidelines ex-
panded the definition "withholding of medically indicated treat-
ment" beyond that in the legislation.' 11 Interim model guidelines
were established for the composition, functions, and procedures of
Infant Care Review Committees (ICRC). The DHHS received
thousands of comments on the proposed rule, including critical com-
ments stating that the proposed rule went beyond the balancing in-
tent of the legislation. 1 16
possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved. The term "infant" is
defined as an infant less than one year of age, although it may include older infants
who have been continuously hospitalized since birth, who were born extremely pre-
maturely or who have long-term disabilities. In addition, the joint statement explains
that the use of the term "inhumane" in exception (c) is not intended to suggest that
the consideration of the humaneness of a particular treatment is not legitimate in any
other context; rather, the sponsors recognize that the issue of humaneness is an ap-
propriate consideration in selecting among alternative treatments. SeeJoint Explana-
tory Statement by Principal Sponsors of Compromise Amendment Regarding
Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants, 130 Cong. Rec. 9,319 (daily ed. July 26,
1984).
112. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 124, 98 Stat. 1749,
1754 (1984) (amending the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5103 (1982)).
113. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985).
114. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45 C.F.R
§ 1340.
115. As originally proposed, the rules set forth extensive clarifying definitions of
many of the statutory terms in the rule itself. These terms include: "treatment,"
"medical neglect," "infant," "merely prolong dying," "not be effective in ameliorat-
ing or correcting all the infant's life-threatening conditions," "virtually futile," and
"the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane." The definitions
provided examples of each of the different types of circumstances which would be
encompassed by each term. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878-901 (1985). By including these
clarifying definitions in the rule, any discretion that may have existed is significantly
eliminated. See Letter from McDermott, Will & Emery to health care clients and se-
lected interested parties (April 17, 1985) [hereinafter McDermott letter] (comparing
the proposed Baby Doe regulations with the DHHS' final rules); E. Van Allen, Sum-
mary of Federal and State "Baby Doe" Legislation (1985) (published by the Minne-
sota Network of Institutional Ethics Committees, a service supported by the
Minnesota Hospital Association).
116. See E. Van Allen, supra note 115, at 1. The DHHS received 116,000 com-
ments on its proposed rule, the majority expressed general support for the regula-
tion. See Kerr, Negotiationg the Compromises, HASTINGS CENT. REP., June, 1985, at 6.
Evidently, another letter-writing campaign was conducted by the right-to-life organi-
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The final rules, hereinafter refered to as "Baby Doe" Rule III,
published on April 15, 1985, do not have the detailed definitions of
the preliminary guidelines.11 7 However, these definitions are in-
zations as many letters strongly endorsed supplying hydration and nutrition to all
disabled infants no matter what their condition and refusing to acknowledge any role
for "quality of life" considerations in the process of medical decision-making. Id.
Among the disapproving comments, the DHHS received input objecting to any
governmental action that interfered with an individual's right to make a personal
treatment decision. Id. These letters urged that the extensive definitions and exam-
ples be eliminated as they led to restraint in treatment decision-making and a pre-
sumption of federally-prescribed and approved medical standards in specific cases.
Id.
Another criticism of the proposed rule centered on the absence of any reference
to ethical considerations in treatment decisions. See Letter from Dana Johnson to
Margeret Heckler (Jan. 23, 1985) (commenting on the proposed rules); Letter from
Daniel Rode to Margaret Heckler (Feb. 8, 1985) [hereinafter Rode Letter] (sug-
gesting substantial changes in the proposed ICRC guidelines). The definitions and
some of the ICRC guidelines neglect the fact that treatment decisions for handi-
capped or critically ill children involve ethical considerations and are rarely made on
the basis of medical judgments alone. In failing to address this issue, the proposed
rules oversimplify the complicated dilemmas faced in treatment decision-making
rather than providing a methodology for approaching these dilemmas in a well-rea-
soned fashion. Id.
Well-reasoned, ethical decisions are part of good medical care. The process of
making a treatment decision for a critically ill or handicapped newborn infant has
been facilitated in some facilities by a step-wise approach. The process centers on six
ethical propositions on which to base a decision, five decision-making principles and,
finally, review by the infant bio-ethics committee. In reviewing the decision, the com-
mittee need not agree or disagree with the parents, who are the primary decision-
makers, but, rather, only ensure that a decision has been made through the principles
of decision-making consistent with the six ethical propositions. Without such a step-
wise process, the ethics committee has no framework in which to operate and it ap-
propriately becomes the decision-making body rather than a committee whose role is
to facilitate a well-reasoned decision by the patients' primary caregivers. SeeJohnson,
Life Death and the Dollar $ign, 252(2) J. AM. MED. Ass'N 233 (1984) (discussing finan-
cial aspect of ethical decision-making); Johnson, Thompson, "Baby Doe" Rules: There
are Alternatives, 138 AM. J. DISEASES OF CHILD. 523 (1984) (describing the ethical pro-
positions and decision-making principles in the process of ethical decision-making).
The guildlines in the proposed rule provide that CPS and ICRC have distinct
functions. The ICRC is intended to counsel physicians, hospital personnel and fami-
lies of patients, while the CPS is charged with determining when the power of the
state must be invoked. However, when a situation arises where the family or physi-
cian believe life-sustaining treatment should be withheld and the ICRC disagrees, the
ICRC is charged with immediately notifying the court or local CPS agency. 50 Fed.
Reg. 14,893 (Apr. 15, 1985).
The model guildines do not allow the ICRC to serve in the manner mentioned in
the preamble to the guidelines. The guidelines establish committees whose role is
punitive, reactive, and investigative. The ICRC becomes an extension of the state
enforcement agency and takes the physician, and to some extent the family, out of
the decision-making process surrounding the treatment and care of the critically ill
infant. Rode Letter, supra note 116.
117. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. DHHS removed all but two of the
proposed rules clarifying definitions from the text of the final rule.
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cluded as an appendix.' 18 Child protection agencies are encouraged
to refer to them.'19
Implementation of the final regulations was delegated to the
states. By October 9, 1985, each state was required to have in place
programs and/or procedures within the state child protection service
system to respond to reports of withholding medically indicated
treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.120
These programs and procedures are included in the state grant ap-
plication for federal child abuse and neglect funds, which must be
approved by DHHS. Enforcement of the law itself will be done
under state child abuse and neglect laws.121
The final model guidelines for ICRCs were more permissive than
were the interim guidelines. Although the ICRCs were optional in
both, the interim guidelines contained mandatory requirements for
composition, functions, basic and specific policies, and procedures
for prospective and retrospective review of cases. 122 They also man-
dated resolution of cases in which there is disagreement among the
parents, the physician, and/or the ICRC.123 These requirements ap-
pear in the final guidelines as recommendations, drafted in language
which is more conciliatory than the interm guidelines. However,
most of the provisions of the interim guidelines are contained in the
appendix. 124
Despite changes in the rule, the DHHS has apparently not aban-
doned its position of absolute "vitalism." Surgeon General C. Ever-
ett Koop emphasized that the ICRCs were not intended to be infant
bioethics committees, indicating "ethical" criteria could not justify
nontreatment.125 The rules articulate a "best interest of the infant"
118. Appendix to Part 1340 -Interpretative Guidelines Regarding 45 C.F.R.
§ 1340.15 -Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants. 45 C.F.R. § 1340, App.
(1986).
119. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(e)(2) (1986). While the DHHS states that the
guildines will not serve as binding rules of law, the guidelines would likely be given at
least some weight by the court. See also McDermott Letter, supra note 115, at 2.
120. Id. § 1340.15 (c)(1)(5). The rule describes the minimum requirements that a
state CPS must fulfill in order to qualify for federal grants under the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act. State CPS agencies must have a procedure to (1)
identify contact persons in health care facilities for initiating and pursuing suspected
cases of medical neglect and (2) assure that state law authorizes the CPS agency to go
to court to intervene in such cases if necessary. The rule also requires that the state
agencies devise ways to get medical records or other information pertinent to an
investigation of medical neglect and to obtain an independent medical examination
as part of such an investigation. Id. § 1340.15 (c)(2).
121. Id. § 1340.15 (c)(2)(iii).
122. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (Apr. 15, 1985).
123. Id.
124. 45 C.F.R. App. § 1340 (1985).
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standard in making treatment decisions and explictly denounce con-
sideration of the infant's future "quality of life" as inconsistent with
the statute.' 26 While allowing "reasonable medical judgment," the
rules repeatedly restrict a physician's discretion to "medical" consid-
erations.127 While the discretion of physicians and parents in treat-
ment decisions is less constrained than under previous rules, the
primacy of the family in decision-making remains in check with this
most recent rule.
"Baby Doe" Rule III still requires treatment in all but a very few
extreme circumstances. This "vitalistic" federal policy has not
changed significantly from the "Baby Doe" Rule 1.128 While the
rules encourage what may be a supportive measure in the form of the
ICRC,129 the guidelines fail to achieve the stated purpose by ignor-
ing ethical considerations and constraining physicians. Both ICRCs
and child protection service agencies must abide by the substantive
federal policy regarding treatment of disabled infants stated in
"Baby Doe" Rule 111.130 This is of special concern in Minnesota
where the state legislation implementing the rule is more intrusive
than the rule requires.131
D. Minnesota Incorporates Federal Regulations
1. Minnesota Legislation
In 1985, the federal definition of "withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment" was included in the definition of medical neglect in
Minnesota Statutes section 260.015.132 The state law was also
changed to include the exceptions to the withholding of medically
indicated treatment as initially charted by the CAA and implemented
by "Baby Doe" Rule 111.133 The resulting state implementation of
126. 45 C.F.R. § 1340, App. 9 (1986).
127. Id.
128. Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 9.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Under the state Baby Doe law, CPS workers are required to verify that "ap-
propriate nutrition, hydration, and medication" are being provided for a disabled
infant and to conclude whether or not medical neglect has occurred. To do so, the
CPS agency must consult with designated hospital staff and the parents and arrange
an independent review of the infant's medical records. If the review is inconslusive,
the CPS agency must seek a court order for an independent medical examination of
the infant. If the review of examination leads to a conclusion of medical neglect, CPS
must intervene by getting a court order for protective custody of the child and file an
expedited motion (with juvenile court) to prevent the withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(c) (1986).
132. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 10(e) (1986). See supra note 111 (citing text of
federal act).
133. Compare MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 10(e) with Child Abuse Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 121, 98 Stat. at 1751.
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the procedural requirements was more intrusive than required by the
federal regulation. The state law went beyond putting in place a pro-
gram or procedure for responding to reports of medical neglect.
Minnesota law mandated steps that local child protection services
must take upon receipt of a report alleging withholding of medically
indicated treatment.' 3 4 At the time these requirements were being
incorporated, local problems involving child abuse litigation in Scott
County contributed to distrust of hospitals and physicians and re-
sulted in a more strict state child abuse and neglect reporting law.i35
A responsible parent or guardian's failure to supply a child with
the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical care is neglect if
the parent is reasonably able to provide these needs.I 6 Minnesota's
policy is to protect children whose health and welfare might be en-
dangered by abuse or neglect.137 Child neglect laws provide for the
termination of all parental rights by a petition to a juvenile court if
the parents have failed to provide their child with the care necessary
for the child's welfare.138
In situations where parental rights are terminated by the state, pa-
134. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(c) (1986) (outlining procedures to be
followed in case of medical neglect as defined by Minnesota Statutes section 260.015,
subdivision 10(e)).
135. E. Van Allen, supra note 115.
136. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 2(c). That section provides:
"Neglect" means failure by a person responsible for a child's care to supply
a child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care when reason-
ably able to do so or failure to protect a child from conditions or actions
which imminently and seriously endanger the child's physical or mental
health when reasonably able to do so .... Neglect also means "medical
neglect" as defined in section 260.015, subdivision 10, clause (e).
Id.
137. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 1. That section provides:
The legislature hereby declares that the public policy of this state is to pro-
tect children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical
abuse, neglect or sexual abuse; to strengthen the family and make the home,
school, and community safe for children by promoting responsible child
care in all settings; and to provide, when necessary, a safe temporary or
permanent home environment for physically or sexually abused children.
Id.
138. MINN. STAT. § 260.221. That section provides:
The juvenile court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent to a
child in the following cases: (a) With the written consent of a parent who for
good cause desires to terminate parental rights; or
(b) If it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:
(1) The parent has abandoned the child; or
(2) That the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or
neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent
and child relationship, including but not limited to providing the child with
necesssary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child's physical, mental or emotional health and develop-
ment, if the parent is physically and financially able ....
1987]
21
Havlisch: Treatment Decision-making in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit—Gov
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL L- W REVIEW
rental financial responsibility may continue.' 3 9 Although the child
receives financial assistance from the state,' 4 0 a parent can be or-
dered to reimburse the county or state agency for the child's care.'
4 '
The details of this legislative action send conflicting messages.
State claims that preserving sanctity of life is a compelling state inter-
est are inconsistent with state actions requiring parental contribu-
tions. If the state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of
children is compelling enough to overcome the presumption of pa-
rental autonomy in deciding a child's welfare, then the state should
be financially responsible for that interest. Statutory ambiguities and
vague statutory language have resulted in limited holdings and con-
fusion in Minnesota courts. 14 2
2. Minnesota Case Law
Minnesota cases have failed to provide guidance concerning the
courts' involvement in the decision-making process and the circum-
stances in which termination of life support systems is appropriate
without court involvement. The Minnesota Supreme Court limited
its decision In the Matter of the Conservatorship of Rudolfo Torres 143 to its
specific fact situation.' 44 In a case involving an incompetent individ-
ual with a court-appointed conservator, a court order was required
to discontinue Mr. Torres' life support systems.14 5 In those situa-
tions where no conservator is involved, no court involvement is
required. 146
The first suit invoking protection of "Baby Doe" Rule III for a
handicapped infant was brought in Redwood County Family Court in
139. The parents may be ordered to make a financial contribution. MINN. STAT.
§ 256.87 (1986).
140. MINN. STAT. § 256.72-.87 (1986) (providing for public welfare assistance).
141. MINN. STAT. § 256.87, subd. I(a). "[T]he court may, upon a motion or order
to show cause, order continuing support contributions by a parent found able to
reimburse the county or state agency." Id.
142. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
143. 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
144. The case involved an incompetent adult in a persistant vegetative state. The
court determined that Minnesota probate courts have both constitutional and statu-
tory authority to order the termination of life support systems and that the probate
court's order of termination in the Tormes case was appropriate. Id. at 338-40. "We
hold under the facts in this case ... that the court's order permitting the removal of
Mr. Torres' respirator was not clearly erroneous." Id. at 341.
145. Id. at 337.
146. In a footnote, the court stated that life support systems may be terminated
without court involvement when the family, attending physician, and the hospital eth-
ics committee are in agreement. Id., n.4. While the court did not set it out, the
presumption is that when there is disagreement in the family or no family member to
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southwestern Minnesota. 147 Under the auspices of "Baby Doe" Rule
III, In re Steinhaus148 was brought to prevent the withholding of medi-
cally indicated treatment from a seven-month-old child-abuse victim
in an irreversible coma. 149 Confusion over the definition of "chroni-
cally and irreversibly comatose" prompted the court to require medi-
cal treatment.' 50 Upon re-opening the case, the court declared that
an infant in a persistant vegetative state falls within the statutory defi-
nition of "chronically and irreversibly comatose."' 5 ' This exception
147. In re Steinhaus, No. 64-J-86-92 (Redwood County, Minnesota, Fam. Ct., Sept.
11, 1986), modified Findings of Fact and Order, No. 64J-86-92 (Redwood County,
Minnesota, Fam. Ct., Oct. 13, 1986).
148. Id.
149. Steinhaus Order at 2. The facts of the case were not disputed. Lance was
born on March 20, 1986. As a result of a severe beating by his father in April of
1986, Lance was rendered comatose and was found by his treating physician to be in
a persistent vegetative state. Lance was admitted to the University of Minnesota Hos-
pitals for intensive care. Lance became a ward of the Redwood County Department
of Welfare shortly after admission to the University of Minnesota Hospitals. After
consulting with Lance's physicians, the child's mother, Amy Steinhaus, requested
that he not receive antibiotics and that a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order be placed
on his medical chart. Id. On the motion of the Redwood County Department of
Welfare for such an order, Judge G. Harrelson of the Redwood County Court issued
a temporary restraining order requiring that Lance receive both antibiotics and re-
suscitation as needed. Id. at 16.
150. The court was faced with motions from Amy Steinhaus and Dr. D. Steinhorn
requesting that the court dissolve the temporary injuction requiring treatment and
order, instead, that personal hygiene, nutrition, hydration and suctioning of oral se-
cretions be continued, but aggressive medical treatment including antibiotic treat-
ment, resuscitation efforts, surgical interventions, and the use of respiratory devices
be proscribed. Steinhaus Order at 2. The court held that Lance was entited to antibi-
otic treatment as part of the appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication. Id. at
10. The court went on to hold that Minnesota Statutes section 260.015, subdivision
10(e) required treatment of Lance because he did not clearly fit into one of the three
exceptions. Id. at 12, 15.
Because Dr. Steinhorn gave undisputed testimony that Lance might survive for
"decades" with treatment, the court held that the language of the futility exceptions
did not apply to Lance. Id. at 11-15. See also 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (3)(b)&(c) (Supp. III
1985); MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 10(e)(2)&(3) (1986). Judge Harrelson's judg-
ment relied on the Interpretative Guidelines accompanying 45 C.F.R.§ 1340 App.
(1985). Steinhaus Order at 12-15.
The court went on to hold it was not clear whether the child met the "chronically
and irreversibly comatose" exception. Id. at 11. The court's recollection of the testi-
mony did not support the finding, but the court went on to state further testimony
and a review of the transcript may be in order. Id. at 11-12. See also 42 U.S.C. § 5102
(3)(a) (Supp. III 1985); MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 10(e)(l) (1986).
The court relied on definitions of "coma" and "persistent vegetative state." A
person in a coma is unresponsive and appears asleep. Steinhaus Order at 11-12. A
person in a vegetative state is unresponsive but appears awake. Id. Although the
level of consciousness is identical, the court held there is a difference. Id.
151. On a motion by Dr. D. Steinhorn and Amy Steinhaus for an order amending
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, the court found Lance to be
"chronically and irreversibly comatose." Steinhaus Amended Order at 3. As such,
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to the medical neglect statute permitted the legal custodian to with-
hold treatment, other than appropriate nutrition, hydration or medi-
cation, without running afoul of the law.152
The court held that the Steinhaus fact situation satisfied one of the
statutory exceptions, namely, exempting the child from aggressive
treatment.153 In actuality, the statute should never have been ap-
plied to this fact situation. The requirement of non-consent to treat-
ment, constituting neglect, was absent.54 Since neither the mother
nor the father had custody of the baby, neither was in a position to
deny medical treatment, thereby medically neglecting their son. In
fact, the state agency charged with protecting medically neglected
children brought the petition to provide only comfort care.' 55 Ab-
sent medical neglect, the statute does not operate to require all med-
ical treatment available. Procedurally, this was not a "Baby Doe"
case.
From the confusion in the Steinhaus case, 156 it is apparent that sub-
stantive ambiguity and procedural laws which plagued the initial
"Baby Doe" Rule I are unresolved after almost five years of govern-
mental modification. Governmental intervention has failed to clarify
issues, and promulgated procedures do not reflect the stated legisla-
tive purpose. As a result, parents, already traumatized by the birth of
federal and state law did not require that the child receive more than appropriate
nutrition, hydration, warmth and medication. A decision by the legal custodian to
withhold treatment other than these comfort measures would not consitute medical
neglect or the withholding of medically indicated treatment. Id.
The petitioners argued that in order to properly interpret the statute, an infant
in a "persistent vegetative state" must be considered "chronically and irreversibly
comatose" for the exception to have any meaning as required by Minnesota Statutes
section 645.17. Memorandum of Petitioner Steinhorn at 4-5. Definitions based on
external appearances is a distinction without a difference when the outcome in either
case is the same for the patient or child. Id. at 6-7.
152. Steinhaus Amended Order at 3.
153. Id.
154. A child must be "neglected" under Minnesota Statute section 260.15, subdi-
vision 10 to warrant intervention by the Welfare Department or the Commissioner.
Lance was not denied any medical care until the court allowed his guardian ad litem
to make the decision. Investigation by the local welfare department is required
before legal proceedings can be instituted. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(c)
(1986). In this case, it was the local welfare agency who petitioned the court to pro-
vide only appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication in a situation where any
appreciation or expression of life was impossible. Obviously, the welfare agency felt
it was a valid request or they would not have filed the motion. Special interest group
intervention mushroomed the significance of the case and brought it to the attention
of the media. As a result, the family court judge in rural Minnesota was forced to
adjudicate on an ambiguous, controversial and emotional issue of first impression.
Interview with Dana Johnson, M.D., Director of the Univeristy of Minnesota Hospi-
tals and Clinics NICU, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Oct. 1, 1986).
155. Supra note 154.
156. See supra notes 150-55.
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a critically ill and disabled child, have been subjected to legal harass-
ment. 157 Given other state and societal protections for handicapped
children, a withdrawal by the government from all but minimal par-
ticipation in treatment decision-making will prevent the further wast-
ing of resources and time.
III. THE PARENTAL UNIT AS THE PRIMARY Locus FOR MEDICAL
DECISION-MAKING
The primacy of the parents in the medical decision-making process
involving critically ill and disabled infants should be maintained for
several reasons. First, a balancing process is used to determine the
most compelling constitutional interest. A parent's right to make
family decisions is a fundamental right to be protected provided the
child is given basic comfort care. Second, the very nature of the fed-
eral government is ill-suited to involvement in medical decision-mak-
ing in complex situations. The rules promulgated by the federal
government are too general to deal with particular situations and are
subject to influence by special interest groups. Third, involvement
at the state level has not eliminated all the problems specific to state
attempts to regulate. State regulation should be limited to providing
for parental informed consent in medical decisions and warmth, nu-
trition, hydration, and appropriate medication for all infants. Fi-
nally, intra-hospital mechanisms presently exist to maintain a
standard of care acceptable to the public at large.
A. Balancing the Constitutional Interests
Parents have a fundamental right to make medical decisions con-
cerning their incompetent, critically-ill, and disabled infants. In re-
cent years, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
persons possess fundamental rights in certain areas of life under the
constitution. In Griswold v. Connecticut,158 the Court established the
fundamental right to make family planning decisions without state
interference.159 The Court found this freedom present in the pen-
umbral right to privacy emanating from the first, third, fourth, fifth,
and ninth amendments.t60 Society has long enforced parents' right
to make family decisions to protect family strength, unity, and paren-
157. Although four out of five courts found their decision reasonable, parents of
Baby Jane Doe were forced to defend that decision in three state courts and two
federal courts. In addition to the emotional distress, Baby Jane Doe's parents had to
suffer the financial consequences of extensive litigation at a time when they were
already facing large medical bills. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 144.
158. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
159. Id. at 485-86. The court held state interference in a married couple's use of
birth control was unconstitutional. Id.
160. Id. at 483-84.
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tal autonomy. 161
Interference with any of an individual's fundamental rights under
the Constitution is allowed only when a strict standard of review has
been satisfied.162 Under this strict standard of review, state interfer-
ence is tolerated only when it stems from a compelling state interest
accomplished through a legislative enactment that is narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.' 63 Because of
this strict standard of review, family decisions on child rearing have
been upheld even when they conflicted with the state's interest.'
64
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 165 indicates that par-
ents' rights to make decisions are not absolute. Roe recognized the
competing interest of a child's right to life had to be balanced against
the mother's right of choice, the mother's right to life, the impact on
the family of an unwanted child and even the impact upon the child if
it were born as an unwanted child.166 The constitutional right to an
abortion was limited to the first trimester of pregnancy when neither
the state nor the medical profession had an interest in the decision to
carry a fetus to term.' 6 7 During the second and third trimesters, the
health of the mother and the state's interest in the life of the fetus
became compelling, allowing state regulation of abortion.168
The Roe case has important implications for medical decision-mak-
ing in the NICU. Concluding that the life of the fetus was distinct
from the life of the mother and the family, Roe pointed out the neces-
sity for a balancing approach.169 Parental rights should be balanced
against the interests of the child and the responsibilities of the
state.' 7 0 In the NICU setting, parents, as compared to the state or
physicians, are most intimately and permanently affected by the life
or death of a child. Protection of a parental decision concerning the
medical treatment of a child is a personal right fundamental to the
concept of ordered liberty.17 1 Over the years, the United States
161. See Shatten & Chabon, Decision-Making and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treat-
mentfor Defective Newborns, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 59, 72 (1982) (there is a strong presump-
tion in favor of parental autonomy and family privacy against coercive state
intervention).
162. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
163. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
164. See Wisconsin v. Roder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (Amish parents permit-
ted to take children out of school before they reached the state's permissible age of
removal).
165. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
166. Id. at 153.
167. Id. at 164.
168. Id. at 164-65.
169. See id. at 153.
170. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836, 843 (1979).
171. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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Supreme Court has continued to hold sacred privacy issues that in-
volve family decisions.1 72
The Court recently affirmed the Roe decision in Thornburgh v. Amer-
ican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.173 The Supreme Court
continues to protect parental decision-making in instances where a
potentially viable fetus with chances for an excellent quality of life is
terminated to preserve the family integrity. A parental decision
aimed at maintaining the family structure and preventing the pro-
longed suffering of a child with little chance for any appreciation of
life is likewise a privacy interest deserving of protection.
Rights obtained as a result of a privacy interest are not absolute. 174
They are qualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.175 State interests in the protection of health
and medical standards at some point become dominant.176 How-
ever, like privacy interests, the state's interest in the preservation of
life is not absolute.177 The welfare of the child must also be consid-
ered. "Children are not property whose disposition is left to paren-
*tal discretion without hinderance."1 78 Parental decisions that
amount to abuse or neglect are outside the sphere of constitutionally
protected parental rights.179 Governmental attempts to define these
terms in the context of treatment decisions for critically ill and dis-
abled infants, however, have been unsuccessful.
Judicial action has consistently affirmed the primacy of the family
in conjunction with the physician in medical decision-making.' 80
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bowen v. American Hospital Associa-
tion 181 once again invalidated federal regulations which encroached
upon the autonomy of family decision-making in life prolonging
medical treatment.' 82 Despite this, the current regulations do not
allow for non-treatment decisions in all the situations where they
172. See Epstein, Court Whittling Away at Privacy, St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dis-
patch, June 15, 1986, G1, col. 1.
173. 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2184-85. But cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843
(1986) (statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults constitutional as not
violating a privacy interest).
174. Griswold, 410 U.S. at 155.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. See American Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 403.
178. Application of Frank T. Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965,
968 (1979).
179. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 709 (3d Cir.
1983).
180. See supra notes 71-99 and accompanying text.
181. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
182. Id. at 2101. See also supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
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may be justifiable.183 Judicial action may be required to mandate
further revisions, probably as further cases present themselves. 184
B. Ineffectiveness of the Federal Government
The legislative and executive branches at both the state and the
federal levels have been unsuccessful at drafting workable standards
in the area of medical decision-making for critically ill and disabled
infants. Their functions within the governmental scheme as well as
their very natures make them ineffective in promulgating regulations
concerning the treatment of critically ill and disabled infants. The
lawmaking powers of the country are delegated to the legislative
branch,185 while the executive branch is charged with carrying the
laws into effect and securing their observance. 186 Both branches are
required to make decisions on a myriad of topics daily. Individual
members are not experts on all subjects and must rely on outside
sources for guidance.
Federal agencies acknowledge that they are inexperienced in the
area of medical decision-making.187 Medical complexities in these
cases are highly technical and best left to evaluation by the medical
professionals who encounter these cases on a regular basis as op-
posed to the majority who encounter these cases only on an emer-
gency or personal basis.188
In order to ensure adequate representation of the people in the
operation of government, legislative and administrative bodies are
large in size. Because of this large size, compromise is required in
order to incorporate all opinions and concerns. Goals may be lost in
conciliatory or vague language. Complicated procedures involving
multiple agencies are developed to satisfy all factions participating in
the decision. The Lance Steinhaus situation89 resulted from vague
language and complicated procedures emanating from state and fed-
eral legislative and administrative bodies.190
Executive and legislative branches, and the administrative agencies
carrying out their mandates, are ill-equipped for treatment decision-
making because they are subject to political and special interest
group pressure. Interest group pressure was evident in the com-
183. See Weir, When Is ItJustifiable Not to Treat?, SECOND OPINION-HEALTH, FAITH
AND ETHICS 42, 42-44 (1986).
184. See id. at 60.
185. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 810 (5th ed. 1979).
186. Id. at 510.
187. See Malcolm, "Baby Doe" Truly a Case of the '80s, St. Paul Pioneer Press & Dis-
patch, June 15, 1986, Gi, col. 4.
188. S. JORDAN, supra note 6, at xiii.
189. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 131.
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ment process surrounding both "Baby Doe" Rules II and 111.191
Elected officials clearly felt pressure from pro-life voters in promul-
gating laws upholding a "vitalistic" view.
The stated goals of federal regulations and other federal actions
are inconsistent. Recent and proposed cuts in federal health care
and social welfare programs jeopardize continuing care for those in-
fants who finally leave intensive care units with severe disabilities.192
Whether a handicapped child maximizes his or her potential de-
pends on what resources are available. A strong network of services
providing custodial, medical, rehabilitative and educational support
for handicapped infants bolsters claims that such infants will benefit
from neonatal intensive care. Mandating care for most ill infants is
inconsistant with the policy seeking to dismantle many of the services
on which handicapped individuals will later depend.193
This inconsistency supports the contention that presidential direc-
tives, congressional action, and federal regulations are in response to
political strategies to pacify right-to-life and disability groups. 1 9 4 If
the goal was truly to eliminate discriminatory treatment of handi-
capped individuals, increased funds for welfare programs would
have been provided.t95
C. Problematic State Involvement
State child protection service agencies enforcing medical treat-
ment of handicapped infants are an improvement over federal "Baby
Doe squads." However, attempts to control medical decision-mak-
ing through child abuse and neglect laws are not ideal. Numerous
procedural and systematic problems196 have been documented de-
191. See supra notes 62 and 116 and accompanying text.
192. Moskop and Saldanha, supra note 11, at 13.
193. Id.
194. See L.A. Daily J., June 16, 1986, at 2, col. 5 ("[a]llied with the administration
are the increasingly assertive 'pro-life' groups that have struggled to circumvent or
overturn the court's 1973 abortion rights decision and more recently have champi-
oned a movement to prevent what they believe to be the common practice of with-
holding life-prolonging treatment of handicapped newborns"). See also Vitiello, The
Baby Jane Doe Litigation and Section 504: An Exercise in Raw Executive Power, 17 CONN. L.
REV. 95, 95-97 (1984) (discussing the Reagan Administration and its political allies in
the right-to-life movement).
195. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
196. Numerous questions were raised by the Minnesota Regional Committee for
Neonatal Life Support Policy concerning procedures:
(1) What is the rule of the juvenile court?
(2) What are the implications if the mother is a minor?
(3) What constitutes a valid report? Current state procedures require cer-
tain information from the reporter to weed out "crank" reports; are these
applicable to medical neglect reports?
(4) How best to provide feedback to the reporters? The reporting law au-
thorizes the CPS agency to provide a summary of the disposition of the re-
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spite the release of individualized state guildeines.197
Like federal actions, state responses are also inconsistent with
stated goals. If the rights of disabled infants and the sanctity of life
are compelling state interests, the state should be willing to pay for
those interests.198 In Minnesota, the parents of criticially ill and dis-
abled children can be made to bear the costs, even in the absence of
any parental right. 199
The state's interest in this area should be restricted to providing
for informed consent for parents and non-burdensome, symbolic
care for infants which upholds public policy. Ambiguous language
supposedly defining when treatment is not required should be elimi-
nated.200 Language providing for warmth, nutrition, hydration, and
appropriate medication for all infants should be maintained.201 Such
an enactment is narrowly drawn to uphold medical standards and
protect the child from neglect. In addition, the language suggested
upholds the public policy against starving children to death.202 Pa-
rental autonomy in medical decision-making is maintained while the
state's interest in protection of the child is maintained.
Advisory committees may provide the most discrete enforcement
of stated federal regulation goals. Bioethics committees have been
shown to maintain the primacy of the parents in the decision-making
process.2 03 In addition, they are also already in place and function-
ing in many institutions, thereby decreasing the time delay in achiev-
port to the reporter if he/she requests it .... [W]ill these apply to medical
neglect reports?
(6) Who will pay the costs for the independent medical review of the in-
fant's medical records and/or examination?
(7) How will law enforcement agencies handle reports?
(8) Should/must CPS of the county of residence.., conduct the investiga-
tion and/or pay any associated costs of the investigation?
These are a sampling of the concerns of the Minnesota Hospital Association. E. Van
Allen, Memorandum to Members of the Regional Committee for Neonatal Life Sup-
port Policy 2-3 (Aug. 15, 1985).
197. See Minnesota Hospital Association, Guidelines for Responding to a Report
of Suspected Medical Neglect of a Hospitalized Disabled Infant with a Life-Threaten-
ing Condition (Sept. 15, 1986).
198. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
199. See MINN. STAT. § 256.87, subd. 1 (1986).
200. See MINN. STAT. § 144.651, subds. 9, 10, 12 (1986).
201. These terms can be concertedly defined. While "appropriate medication"
has been a source of confusion in the past, the definition either includes antibiotics or
it does not. This is a much easier determination to make than whether treatment is
"futile." Medications to control seizures and secretions and pain are well accepted
already. Lecture by Dana Johnson to the Neonatal and Pediatric Special Interest
Group (Feb. 18, 1987).
202. Id. Dr. Johnson suggested avoiding the legislation of both medical and ethi-
cal practice.
203. Kliegman, Mahowald, Youngner, In Our Best Interests: Experience and Working of
an Ethics Review Committee, 108J. OF PEDIATRICS 178, 179 (1986).
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Drawbacks to this approach exist as well. 205 ICRCs conforming to
the guidelines in "Baby Doe" Rule III are "intrusive in nature, and
naive in the simplicity with which [they view] the moral dilemmas"
faced in the care of handicapped and critically ill children.206 ICRCs
are described as more than advisory and policy-making entities and
may limit a physician's discretion.207
D. Intra-Hospital Controls in Existence
Treatment decision-making concerning criticially ill and disabled
infants involves a balancing of individuals' rights in a specific fact
situation. Since the court system exists to protect individual rights
and render verdicts on a case by case basis,208 the judiciary seems to
be the branch of government best-suited to handle cases of such a
personal and emotional nature. This branch of government has re-
peatedly affirmed the primacy of family in treatment decisions in-
volving critically ill and disabled infants.209
The time and resources expended on the "Baby Doe" rules over
the last five years indicate a distrust of pediatricians and neonatolo-
gists. This position is in conflict with the high respect the medical
profession enjoys for both its technical accomplishments and hu-
manitarian service.210 In addition to their personal commitment to
preserving life, physicians are constrained by the Hippocratic oath to
"do no harm," 2 1t and legal liability for malpractice.2 12
204. Twenty-two percent of Minnesota hospitals have ethics committees; 33 are
established committees and six more are in various stages of formation. Ethics com-
mittees are most likely to be found in large hospitals; 89% of hospitals with 200 or
more beds have ethics committees; 50% of the ethics committees are in hospitals
with religious affiliation. Minn. Network for Institutional Ethics Committees, 6 ETH-
ics NEWS 1,Jan., 1986.
205. See Annas, Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment for Minors, 23J. FAM. L. 217 (1985).
This author feels that committee decision-making, at least in areas of life and death is
the worst kind available. Two outcomes are possible. First, a pattern may develop,
as more and more decisions are made, whereby one can begin to articulate the princi-
ples that the committee is applying to make its decision. If principles can be articu-
lated, then a committee is not needed to apply them. Alternatively, no pattern will
develop and the committee will be making decisions arbitrarily. Id. at 229.
206. Johnson & Thompson, The "Baby Doe" Rule: It is all Bad?, 73 PEDIATRICS 729,
729 (1984).
207. See E. Van Allen, supra note 115, at 1.
208. BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 318 (5th ed. 1979).
209. See, e.g., Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2114; University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 144; Weber, 60
N.Y.2d at 208, 456 N.E.2d at 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 63, aff'd, 95 A.D.2d at 587, 467
N.Y.S.2d at 685.
210. S. JORDAN, supra note 6, at xiii.
211. Moskop & Saldanha, supra note 11, at 11.
212. Increasing numbers of medical malpractice claims prompted the Minnesota
Legislature, in 1986, to enact a tort reform act. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, 1986
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NICUs are the locus for the great majority of treatment decision-
making concerning critically ill and disabled infants. Smaller hospi-
tals routinely transfer their critically ill patients to larger tertiary care
centers213 which are better able to supply the technology and skilled
personnel to care for these patients. Likewise, critically ill and dis-
abled patients are transferred to NICUs which exist almost exclu-
sively in tertiary care centers.
A network of medical professionals and support staff are involved
in the care of any patient in a tertiary care center.214 Ethics commit-
tees are in place in eighty-nine percent of tertiary care centers in
Minnesota.215 The very nature of the tertiary care center provides a
set of checks and balances to ensure protection of critically ill and
disabled newborns from medical neglect.
Reports of alleged medical neglect of critically ill and disabled in-
fants have been few in number. 216 Of those reported, all have been
unfounded.217 Given the very rare occurrence of even a suspected
problem, the state's interest does not rise to the compelling level,
justifying the vague and ambiguous statutory exceptions. Unfortu-
nately, parents of critically ill and disabled infants continue to face
legal harassment2 18 as a result of the administrative regulations
prompted by executive and legislative mandate addressing a prob-
lem that does not exist.
CONCLUSION
Parents are in the best position to make decisions concerning the
Minn. Laws 840. See Note, Introduction to Minnesota's Tort Reform Act, 13 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 277 (1987).
213. Tertiary care centers are equipped to provide advanced life support and
highly complex treatments and surgery. In addition to possessing highly technical
capabilities, teaching and researching are part of the program. Tertiary care centers
are generally large by necessity to accomplish these goals.
214. The large size and capability of caring for the most complex patients requires
a large medical support staff. A survey of the medical staffing of the NICUs in the
Twin Cities revealed a minimum of two and a maximum of eight neonatalogists plus
two to seven residents and interns. The residents and interns manage the care of
NICU patients under the direction of the staff neonatologists. Nursing staffs of sixty
to one hundred provide direct patient care. All hospitals have social work and pa-
tient relation departments as well to serve patients and their families.
215. Minn. Network for Institutional Ethics Committees, 6 ETHIcs NEWS 1 (1986).
216. Two cases have been reported since the rules went into effect on Oct. 9,
1985, but none in the last year. Lecture by Dana Johnson to Neonatal and Pediatric
Special Interest Group (Feb. 18, 1987) (discussing the legal and ethical issues of
Baby Doe legislation).
217. One case involved a child more than one year old and, therefore, by defini-
tion, did not invoke Baby Doe regulation. A second case was parent neglect rather
than medical neglect. Id.
218. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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medical treatment of their critically ill and/or disabled infant. The
parents are most intimately and permanently affected by the treat-
ment decision whether it results in the life or death of a child. Emo-
tional, physical and financial effects will be felt by the family no
matter what decision is made. This parental right is constitutionally
protected as a privacy interest.219 "[S]o long as the child is part of a
viable family, his own interests are merged with those of the other
members."220
Judicial fiat has affirmed the strict protection of privacy interests as
well as the primacy of the family in medical decision-making.221 The
executive and legislative branches of the government continue to
promulgate regulations undermining this position, apparently
believing their judgment superior to the parents and the medical
professionals directly involved.222 The infrequent incidence of with-
holding treatment nationwide emphasizes societal constraints.
These constraints maintain a standard of care for these critically ill
and disabled newborns that we can all live with.223
Despite attempts at clarification, the regulations remain ambigu-
ous in structure. In attempts to eliminate the ambiguity, parents, al-
ready suffering the anguish of having a severely handicapped child,
are forced to defend themselves in court.224 In addition to the emo-
tional distress, parents are suffering legal harassment and the finan-
cial consequences of extensive litigation when they were already
facing large medical bills.225
As mandated by the Supreme Court, state legislation and federal
regulation should be amended so that parents regain their primacy
in the decision-making process. 226 The state's legitimate interest in
a child's welfare can be unambiguously expressed and narrowly
drawn, thereby upholding public policy without disrupting the pa-
rental decision-making process.
Rebecca A. Havlisch
219. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
220. A. FREUD,J. GOLDSTEIN, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
1 (1973).
221. See supra notes 96-104 and 161-82 and accompanying text.
222. See L.A. Daily J., June 12, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
223. See E. Van Allen, supra note 115, at 1.
224. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
225. Id.
226. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2123.
1987]
33
Havlisch: Treatment Decision-making in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit—Gov
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1987], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss4/7
